Notes on Aquinas

[1] Every agent acts for a good. [2] We know that an agent tends toward something and not toward something indefinite. So what is this something? It must be something that is appropriate to it--an agent would only incline to something if there was some agreement with it. If something is appropriate for a thing, it is also good for that thing. So, every agent acts for a good. [3] As Aristotle says, "the good is that which all desire." So, if a person obtains and enjoys something good, there is a satisfaction of desire--in other words, there is a termination of the desire. The same can be said of an end. The appetitive inclination of an agent finds its rest in an end. So, every action and motion are for the sake of something good. [4] The goal of every action and movement is being--either that it may be preserved in the species or that something may come into being ("or that it may be newly acquired"). To exist is something good--so everything desires it. So, all acti...

[1] The first thing we need to show is: that in acting every agent intends an end . [2]  What is an end? Some things obviously act for an end and others do not obviously act for an end. Definition of an end: "that toward which the inclination of the agent tends." If an agent attains this, the agent attains its end. If an agent fails to attends this, it fails in regard to the end intended. For example, the end of a physician is health and the end of a runner is "a set objective" (to win a race, to reach a destination, etc.). This definition applies both to knowing beings and unknowing beings. The end of an archer is the target; the end of the motion of an arrow is the target. Does every inclination of an agent tends toward something definite? Different kinds of actions stem from different kinds of powers. The action of heating stems from the power of heat; the action of cooling stems from the power of cold. Some actions terminate in something that is made: For exampl...