ST I-II Q. 18 Aquinas Why are wrong actions wrong?

 "We must therefore say that every action has goodness, insofar as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness, insofar as it is lacking in something that is due to its fullness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind."

https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I-II.Q18.A1.C

So, if you smoke a brisket for too long, the action is wrong because it "lacks the quantity determined by reason"--not because the brisket is dry.

So, why is it wrong to shake a can of beer before opening it?

"Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For if there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil."

Shaking a can of beer before opening it has goodness insofar as it has being and the possibility of action. But it lacks the ? determined by reason.

Adultery lacks the order of reason.

[SCG III.129: "if this measure is set aside the result is harmful to man, as is evident in the immoderate eating of food. Therefore, there are some human acts that are naturally fitting and others that are naturally unfitting."

Also, any actions that hinder rational activity are naturally evil.

Also, actions by which we incline toward our natural end are "naturally appropriate" and those that have the contrary effect are naturally inappropriate.]

Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness.

I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; second, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms.

https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I-II.Q18.A7.Obj3

To fight well is of itself ordained to victory; to shake a can of beer is of itself ordained to explosions.


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